Abstract-Signal-processing modules working directly on encrypted data provide an elegant solution to application scenarios where valuable signals must be protected from a malicious processing device. In this paper, we investigate the implementation of the discrete Fourier transform (DFT) in the encrypted domain by using the homomorphic properties of the underlying cryptosystem. Several important issues are considered for the direct DFT: the radix-2 and the radix-4 fast Fourier algorithms, including the error analysis and the maximum size of the sequence that can be transformed. We also provide computational complexity analyses and comparisons. The results show that the radix-4 fast Fourier transform is best suited for an encrypted domain implementation in the proposed scenarios.
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I. INTRODUCTION
R
ECENT advances in signal-processing technology create the opportunity for a large variety of new applications ranging from multimedia content production and distribution to advanced health-care systems for continuous health monitoring. These developments raise several important issues concerning the security of the digital content to be processed, including intellectual property rights management, authenticity, privacy, and conditional access.
Currently available solutions for secure manipulation of signals apply some cryptographic primitives in order to build a secure layer on top of the signal-processing modules. An example of this approach is represented by the encryption of compressed multimedia signals: the multimedia content is first of all compressed through a state-of-the-art compression scheme, and next, encryption of the compressed bit stream is carried out. Consequently, the bit stream must be decrypted before the content can be decompressed and processed.
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Digital Object Identifier 10.1109/TIFS. 2008.2011087 protect the data against third parties or to provide authenticity. Unfortunately, this may not be sufficient in some applications since the owner of the data may not trust the processing devices, or those actors that are required to manipulate them. As a first example, let us consider a situation where a user (say Alice) resorts to a continuous monitoring health-care system to analyze her medical/biological data in order to obtain a fast prealert diagnosis to help her stay healthy. She will be very likely not to trust the service provider that will be required to analyze her data while they are encrypted. At the same time, the service provider may want to keep its processing algorithms secret since they represent the basis for its business. As a second example, we may consider a situation where a user wants to query a database (e.g., a database containing biometric data) without revealing to the database owner (say Bob) what he is looking for (again, this necessity may be due to privacy reasons). It is evident that the availability of tools that allow the processing of an encrypted query would represent valuable help in solving this problem.
In the following text, we will refer to the aforementioned approach, where signals are processed as they are encrypted, as signal processing in the encrypted domain (s.p.e.d.).
Though processing encrypted signals may seem a formidable, if not impossible task, a few approaches exist that make s.p.e.d. possible. The majority of these approaches concern content retrieval and content protection applications. The interested reader can find an extensive review of these secure signal-processing applications in [1] . By neglecting ad-hoc solutions that are suited to solve only particular problems in very narrow scenarios, two general approaches exist to process encrypted signals: the first one is based on homomorphic encryption [2] , [3] and the second one relies on multiparty computation (MPC) [4] - [6] .
A cryptosystem is said to be homomorphic with respect to an operation if an operator exists so that for any two plain messages and , we have (1) where denotes the encryption (decryption) operator. It is evident that homomorphic encryption provides an elegant way of performing at last a reduced set of operations by working on encrypted data. Among homomorphic cryptosystems, additively homomorphic encryption plays a crucial role in practical applications since it provides a way of applying any linear operator in the encrypted domain.
The second approach to s.p.e.d. relies on MPC [4] . Here, players want to compute the output of a function with inputs, each of which is known to one of the players. An MPC protocol permits computing the output of without the players 1556-6013/$25.00 © 2009 IEEE having to reveal their private inputs. It has been shown [4] that at least, in principle, the output of any function can be computed securely through MPC; the problem, however, is that MPC protocols are extremely complex since they may require that several interactive rounds be carried out among the players to compute the output of .
In this paper, we focus on noninteractive s.p.e.d. Specifically, we focus on the representation problems that must be solved in order to exploit homomorphic encryption for processing encrypted signals.
The classical ways to represent signals are through floating-point or fixed-point arithmetic. Unfortunately, floating-point and fixed-point arithmetic are not suited for implementation in the encrypted domain through homomorphic encryption. As a matter of fact, adding two floating-point numbers requires more complex operations than simple addition: first, the numbers must be expressed in a form having the same exponent, then the significands must be added and then the exponent adjusted so that the significand of the result stays in the range. Clearly, these operations cannot be carried out in the encrypted domain by relying on homomorphic encryption only, but some interactive protocol is required [7] . Similar considerations hold for fixed-point arithmetic, where after each addition (multiplication), the resulting number must be truncated to avoid overflow and underflow errors. 1 In this paper, we focus on the aforementioned representation problem in the framework of DFT/FFT computation in the encrypted domain. In fact, DFT and FFT are very popular signalprocessing tools and, hence, it is very likely that they will have to be implemented in s.p.e.d. applications. This is the case, for instance, of a pattern-recognition module operating on a set of frequency coefficients, a frequency-domain watermarking system embedding the watermark in the encrypted domain [8] - [10] , or a filtering operation carried out in the frequency domain. 2 Specifically, we introduce a theoretical framework where the signal representation problem can be analyzed and solved. Several important issues are considered for the direct DFT: the radix-2 and the radix-4 fast Fourier algorithms, including the error analysis and the maximum size of the sequence that can be transformed. We also provide computational complexity analyses and comparisons. The results show that the radix-4 FFT is best suited for an encrypted domain implementation in the proposed scenarios.
Despite the focus of the paper being on DFT/FFT implementation, the theoretical framework we developed is a very general one and can be used in a wide variety of situations.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. In Section II, the encrypted-DFT (e-DFT) is defined and the related representation problem is introduced. Section III reviews some properties of homomorphic and probabilistic cryptosystems and gives a summary of Paillier cryptosystem. In Section IV, we introduce suitable signal representation for the encrypted domain. Section V is devoted to the analysis of the upper bounds on the encrypted domain representation for different DFT implementations, whereas Section VI takes quantization errors into account. In Section VII, we derive the complexity of different s.p.e.d. FFT algorithms (namely, radix-2 and radix-4 FFT). Finally, in Section VIII, we propose some examples of s.p.e.d. FFT designs, while some concluding remarks are given in Section IX.
II. ENCRYPTED DOMAIN-DISCRETE FOURIER
TRANSFORM (E-DFT) The DFT of a sequence is defined as (2) where and are a finite duration sequence with length . Among the appealing properties of the aforementioned transform, one is that it can be implemented via fast algorithms, noted as fast Fourier transforms (FFTs).
We will consider a scenario in which the transform processor is fed with a sample-wise encrypted version of the input vector, that is (3) In order to make linear computations on encrypted values possible, we will assume that the chosen cryptosystem is homomorphic with respect to the addition, that is, an operator exists such that (4) With such a cryptosystem, it is indeed possible to add two encrypted values without first decrypting them. Moreover, it is possible to multiply an encrypted value by a public integer value by repeatedly applying the operator . Another required property of the cryptosystem is that it should be probabilistic, or semantically secure, that is, given two encrypted values, it should not be possible to decide whether they conceal the same value. This is fundamental since the alphabet to which the input samples belong to is usually limited, and a nonsemantically secure cryptosystem would disclose a great amount of information about the statistical distribution of the input signal. A widely known example of a cryptosystem fulfilling both of the aforementioned requirements is the Paillier cryptosystem [11] , for which the operator is a modular multiplication. Since the DFT transform coefficients are public, the expression in (2) can be computed on an encrypted input vector by relying on the homomorphic property, as will be shown in Section IV. As we already mentioned, when the aforementioned idea is applied, in practice, some issues need to be addressed.
First of all, the input samples and the DFT coefficients need to be represented as integer values. Since many practical homomorphic cryptosystems (e.g., Paillier) are based on modular operations on a finite field/ring, the inputs and the output values need to be correctly represented as integers on an appropriate finite field. Here, by "correctly represented," we mean that the actual value of a sample should always be recoverable from its finite-field representation. For example, if we are working on , the set of integers modulo , we should have ; otherwise, its magnitude will be lost due to the modulo operations.
Second, FFT-like algorithms should be applicable also in the encrypted domain, thus achieving the same computation savings achievable in the plain domain.
In the sequel, we will present a theoretical framework wherein the aforementioned issues can be cast and solved. A convenient signal representation for s.p.e.d. will be proposed, allowing us to define a s.p.e.d. DFT and a s.p.e.d. FFT. We will analyze the quantization error introduced by the s.p.e.d. implementation and the maximum size of the sequence that can be transformed. Moreover, we will provide computational complexity analysis, taking into account the requirements of different s.p.e.d. scenarios.
III. HOMOMORPHIC AND PROBABILISTIC CRYPTOSYSTEMS
One tool for signal processing in the encrypted domain is represented by cryptosystems that enable carrying out some basic algebraic operations on encrypted data by translating them into corresponding operations in the plaintext domain. The concept of privacy homomorphism was first introduced by Rivest et al. [2] : in this paper, the authors define privacy homomorphisms as encryption functions which permit encrypted data to be operated on without preliminary decryption of the operands.
For an exact definition of a homomorphic cryptosystem, let us first introduce some notations: given a set of possible plain texts , a set of cipher texts , and a key pair (public key and secret key), a public key encryption scheme is a couple of functions , such that, given a plaintext , and such that given a cipher text , it is computationally unfeasible to determine such that , without knowing the secret key . According to the correspondence between the operation in the ciphertext domain and the operation in the plaintext domain, a cryptosystem can be additively homomorphic or multiplicatively homomorphic: in this paper, we will focus on the former.
An additively homomorphic cryptosystem allows to map an addition in the plaintext domain to an operation in the ciphertext domain, that usually is a multiplication. Given two plaintexts and , the following equalities are then satisfied:
and as a consequence (6) where is a public integer and (7) Additively homomorphic cryptosystems allow performing the encrypted domain additions, subtractions and multiplications with a known (nonencrypted) value. However, it is not possible to perform divisions, since this operation could lead to noninteger values.
Another feature that we need is that the encryption scheme does not encrypt two equal plain texts into the same cipher text. More generally, given two encrypted values, it should not be computationally feasible to decide whether they conceal the same value or not. For this purpose, it is possible to define a scheme where the encryption function is a function of the secret message and a random parameter , such that if , no adversary can distinguish from , for any two secret messages . Let and ; for correct behavior, the scheme has to be designed in such a way that , that is, the decryption phase is deterministic, not depending on the random parameter . A scheme that satisfies the aforementioned property is commonly referred to as probabilistic [3] or semantically secure.
Luckily, encryption schemes that satisfy the homomorphic and probabilistic properties detailed before do exist. One of the most known homomorphic and probabilistic schemes is the one presented by Paillier in [11] , and later modified by Damgård and Jurik in [12] .
A. Paillier Cryptosystem
The cryptosystem described in [11] , usually referred to as Paillier cryptosystem, is based on the problem to decide whether a number is an th residue modulo . This problem is believed to be computationally hard in the cryptography community, and is linked to the hardness to factorize , if is the product of two large primes. For a complete description of the Paillier cryptosystem, we refer to the original paper [11] . Here, we simply give the encryption and the decryption procedures. The notation we use is the classic one, with the set of the integer numbers modulo , and the set of invertible elements modulo (i.e., all of the integer numbers modulo that are relatively prime with ).
1) Setup: Select , big primes. The private key is the least common multiple of , denoted as . Let and in be an element of order 3 for some ( is usually a convenient choice). is the public key. where . From the above equations, we can easily verify that the Paillier cryptosystem is additively homomorphic, since .
IV. SIGNAL MODEL FOR THE ENCRYPTED DOMAIN
Let us consider a signal , with , . In the following, we will assume that the signal is bounded in amplitude, i.e., , from which . In order to process in the encrypted domain, the signal values must be approximated by suitable integers. This is accomplished by the following quantization process: (8) where is the rounding function and is a suitable scaling factor. Fore the sake of simplicity, we will assume that is an integer. Based on the properties of , the quantized signal will satisfy . In the following, we will consider the encryption of as the separate encryption of both and , i.e., . Hence, if the cryptosystem encrypts integers modulo we need a one-to-one mapping between and , so that we can always recover the correct value of from . This can be achieved by imposing , so that
The coefficients in (2) can be quantized using the same strategy as above. In particular, we define (10) where is the DFT coefficient scaling factor. Thanks to the properties of , we have . Based on the definitions above, the integer approximation of the DFT is defined as (11) Since the equation just shown requires only integer multiplications and integer additions, it can be evaluated in the encrypted domain by relying on homomorphic properties. However, the s.p.e.d. implementation of complex additions and complex multiplications should be considered. The implementation of a complex addition is trivial. As for complex multiplication, two implementations can be considered [13] , either requiring four real multiplications and two real additions or three real multiplications and three real additions
. If the inputs are encrypted with the Paillier cryptosystem, when implemented in the encrypted domain, such implementations become (12) (13) where , , , and all computations are carried out modulo . For example, if we use (12) , the DFT in the encrypted domain can be evaluated as (14) for .
V. UPPER BOUNDS AND MAGNITUDE REQUIREMENTS
The computation of the DFT using (11) requires two problems to be tackled. The first one is that there will be a scaling factor between and the desired value . The second one is that in order to implement (11) by using a cryptosystem which encrypts integers modulo , one must ensure that the one-to-one mapping in (9) still holds for . Hence, according to the proposed model, one has to find an upper bound on such that , and verify that . In the following equation, we will show that, irrespective of the DFT implementation, can always be expressed as (15) where is a scale factor depending on the particular implementation, whereas takes the propagation of the quantization error into account.
Based on (15), the desired DFT output can be obtained as . As for the upper bound, we have . Hence, for all , we obtain (16) where is a suitable upper bound on and we used . The value of and depends on the scaling factors and and on the particular implementation of the DFT. These issues will be discussed in Sections V-A-C.
A. Direct Computation
Let us express the quantized samples in (8) and the quantized coefficients in (10) as and , respectively, where and are the quantization errors. If the DFT is computed directly by applying (11), then we have (17) The scaling factor in (15) is then . As for the upper bound given by (16) , due to the properties of the rounding function, . Hence, , and after simple manipulations (18) from which we derive . 1) Real-Valued Signals: In the case of the DFT of a realvalued signal, the direct DFT computation can be expressed as (19) From the properties of and , it is evident that . Therefore, the real and the imaginary part of the integer DFT values will satisfy . This upper bound is lower than in the complex-valued case. However, in the case of an FFT algorithm, this applies only for the first stages, since a generic stage of the FFT will consider a vector of complex valued samples. It is also worth noting that real-valued signals are usually processed by means of a half-length complex FFT [14] since this leads to a sensible reduction of the complexity. Hence, in the following text, only the complex-valued case will be considered.
2) Bounds on Complex Multiplications:
The bound in (18) does not take the intermediate computations of a complex multiplication into account. This is not a problem in the case of (12), since , that is, the intermediate values are bounded by the final value. However, in the case of (13), we have and (i.e., the intermediate values may exceed the final values). In order to cope with this behavior, the bound in (18) should be multiplied by a factor whenever (13) is used. For the sake of simplicity, the upper bounds in Sections V-B and C will be derived under the hypothesis that (12) is used. The corresponding upper bounds in the case of (13) can be obtained by multiplying by .
B. Decimation in Time Radix-2 FFT
This algorithm is applied when and allows the DFT to be computed in stages, each requiring complex multiplications. At each stage, a pair of coefficients is obtained as a linear combination of the corresponding pair of coefficients computed at the previous stage, using the following butterfly structure: (20) (21) where the indices , , and the exponent depend on the particular stage [15] . The computation of the aforementioned butterfly can be performed in the encrypted domain by applying the proposed model, yielding (22) (23) Note that the multiplication with is required in order to add (or subtract) integers which are related to the corresponding complex coefficients by the same scale factor. Hence, the integer implementation of the FFT algorithm requires integer multiplications at each stage.
As for the upper bound analysis, the two branches of the butterfly are equivalent. Without loss of generality, let us consider the first branch. If we express , then we have (24) from which we derive the following recursive relations:
At the first stage , where indicates in bit reverse order, so that the recursion starts with and . By using the initial conditions in (26), it is easy to derive the scale factor as . As for the evaluation of the final upper bound, we consider an equivalent recursive relation on an upper bound of the quantization error represented in (26), given as (27) By using the initial condition in (27), the upper bound on the final quantization error can be expressed as (28) However, the above upper bound does not take into account the properties of the twiggle factors , which, in particular cases, may be quantized with smaller quantization errors than the upper bound or even without any quantization error. In particular, at the first stage, we have , whereas at the second stage, we have . In both cases, no integer multiplication is required, and the butterflies can be modified so that no scaling factor is introduced. Therefore, and by using (26), it is easy to derive the scale factor as . As for the upper bound, in the case of the first two stages, the expression in (27) is simplified as , since . Hence, by using as initial condition in (27) (since ), the upper bound on the quantization error can be expressed as (29) from which we derive the final upper bound on as .
C. Decimation in Time Radix-4 FFT
This algorithm can be employed when and allows the DFT to be computed in stages, each requiring complex multiplications. The rationale of the radix-4 algorithm is that an -point DFT can be evaluated as a linear combination of four -point DFTs. Using this strategy, at each stage, four new coefficients are obtained as a linear combination of four coefficients computed at the previous stage by using the following radix-4 butterfly [16] (30) Without loss of generality, the upper bound can be evaluated by considering the integer version of the first branch in the butterfly, that is (31) By using the same model as with the radix-2 case, the following recursive relations can be derived:
Moreover, at the first stage of the radix-4 FFT algorithm , so that the recursion begins with and . The scale factor is given as , whereas the quantization error upper bound is (34) from which we derive the upper bound on as . The parameters determining the upper bounds for the different DFT implementations are summarized in Table I .
VI. ERROR ANALYSIS
The effects of finite precision arithmetic on DFT/FFT computation have been extensively investigated in the literature [17] - [19] . However, the encrypted domain implementation of the DFT introduces some important differences with respect to the classical fixed-point case. Since there is no rescaling after multiplication (as we said, we cannot rescale the encrypted values due to the limited set of operations made available by homomorphic encryption), there is no computational noise, which is one of the most relevant noise sources in fixed-point implementations. Hence, the error introduced by the proposed DFT/FFT is only due to the quantization of the twiddle factors.
In order to estimate the overall quantization error on the DFT values, the noise-to-signal ratio (NSR) will be evaluated. We will assume that and are i.i.d. variables with zero mean and variance and , respectively. Although is deterministic, this will produce a simple estimate of the quantization noise.
As for the input signal, its NSR can be estimated as (35) where indicates the signal power. If we consider the DFT/FFT computation, the output NSR can be estimated as (36) where is the variance of . In the case of the direct DFT computation, by relying on (17) and neglecting the terms , we can estimate . Hence, it is easy to derive (37)
In the case of a radix-2 FFT, the variance of the error at the th stage can be recursively approximated by relying on (26) as (38) If we set the initial conditions and , then
we have . Therefore, the NSR can be expressed as (39) Finally, in the case of a radix-4 FFT, the variance of the error at the th stage can be recursively approximated in a similar way as (40) and since the initial conditions are and , the error at the last stage is . Therefore, the NSR is given by (41)
A. Comparison With Plaintext Implementation
Since the value of and, hence, will be fixed by the properties of the input signal, the aforementioned formulas permit evaluating the degradation introduced on the encrypted DFT coefficients as a function of . A fair design criterion could be that of choosing a value of which yields a similar degradation with respect to that introduced by a plaintext FFT implementation.
In the following text, comparisons will be made using a plaintext radix-2 FFT. Consider that other plaintext FFTs yield similar results. According to the way a plaintext FFT is implemented, two cases need to be analyzed: Case 1) Fixed-point implementation: If a plaintext radix-2 FFT is implemented on fixed-point hardware with registers having bits and scaling is performed at each stage, an equivalent encrypted domain implementation should satisfy [15] , where is the power of the input signal, assumed white. If we assume a uniformly distributed quantization error on the DFT coefficients (i.e., ), we have radix-2 FFT radix-4 FFT (42) where we have assumed . As a consequence, the s.p.e.d. implementation will require in the worst case bits for quantizing the twiddle factors (i.e., we save approximately bits with respect to a plaintext fixed-point implementation). Case 2) Floating-point implementation: In the case of plaintext radix-2 FFT implementation on floating-point hardware using bits for the fractional part, the NSR bound is given by [15] . Hence radix-2 FFT radix-4 FFT. 
VII. COMPLEXITY ANALYSIS
The complexity of the proposed DFT implementation in the encrypted domain depends on several parameters which are related to the used cryptosystem, its homomorphic properties, to the input signal, and the desired NSR level.
For the sake of simplicity, in this paper, we will assume that a Paillier cryptosystem or one of its extensions is used. Hence, each addition between plaintexts will be translated into a modular multiplication between cyphertexts, and each multiplication between plaintexts will be translated into a modular exponentiation of a cyphertexts to a plaintext. Moreover, encrypted subtraction requires modular division, which is usually more complex than modular multiplication [20] , [21] . In the following text, we will consider an implementation of subtractions requiring one modular multiplication and one modular inversion. The same holds for exponentiations to negative exponents, usually implemented as . As a result, the complexity will be evaluated as the number of modular exponentiations (ME), modular multiplications (MM), and modular inversions (MI), which are required for implementing the DFT/FFT algorithms in the encrypted domain.
The DFT/FFT algorithms are based on complex-valued arithmetic. Hence, the complexity of a complex addition, complex subtraction, and complex multiplication have to be translated into ME, MM, and MI. As for a s.p.e.d. complex addition, it always requires two MMs, while the complexity of a complex subtraction is two MMs and two MIs. As for complex multiplication, we consider the two implementations in (12)- (13), either requiring four MEs, two MMs and one MI, or three ME, three MMs, and two MIs. Moreover, if we assume that the sign of the multipliers is uniformly distributed, either two additional MIs or one-and-a-half additional MIs should be considered on average. Finally, if a complex value is multiplied by a real value (rescaled), the complexity is always two MEs and one MI on average. The complexity of the direct DFT is simply complex multiplications and complex additions. The complexity of radix-2 can be derived as follows. Each stage of the radix-2 FFT, except the first two stages, requires complex multiplications plus rescalings of complex values when implemented in the encrypted domain. Moreover, each stage also requires complex additions and complex subtractions. A similar procedure can be used to derive the complexity of the encrypted radix-4 FFT. In this case, each stage, except for the first stage, requires complex multiplications plus rescalings of complex values. Moreover, each radix-4 stage requires also complex additions and complex subtractions. The complexity results for the different algorithms in terms of MEs, MMs, and MIs are summarized in Tables II and III. A remark about the encrypted discrete Fourier transform (DFT)/fast Fourier transform (FFT) complexity is in regard to the different weight of different modular operations. If , a modular exponentiation will require, on average, modular multiplications. Hence, in several practical cases, the cost of the modular multiplications is negligible. This may not hold true in the case of the modular inversions, whose complexity is, in general, higher than that of modular multiplication. Hence, the choice of the most convenient implementation between the four multiplication scheme and the three multiplication scheme will depend on the actual implementation of modular inversion/division.
When the modulus used by the cryptosystem remains the same, independent of the implementation, the aforementioned estimates can be directly compared and the results are similar to the classical case. However, in order to maintain the same value of , the maximum allowable value of is reduced in the case of the FFT algorithms. Since there can be some applications in which this may not be acceptable because of the requirements on the quantization noise, the analysis of the overall complexity is strongly dependent on the actual values of and .
VIII. PRACTICAL EXAMPLES
As shown in the previous sections, the choice of the parameters of the DFT to be implemented in the encrypted domain depends on several aspects, including the constraints imposed by the cryptosystem, the required signal-to-noise ratio (SNR), and the complexity of the implementation. The aim of this section is to provide design criteria which take the different issues raised by the s.p.e.d. DFT into account. First, we will try to identify some typical scenarios that can be encountered in practical applications. Therefore, we will show how the proposed analysis allows us to assess which s.p.e.d. DFT algorithm is more suitable for a particular scenario. In the derivation of such criteria, the analysis made in the previous sections has a crucial role, since it allows us to give general rules for the choice of the s.p.e.d. DFT parameters, which will also apply to more general scenarios.
We will assume that each encrypted domain implementation fulfills the same requirements in terms of input and output NSR as the plaintext version. Moreover, for the sake of simplicity, we will assume that and are powers of two (i.e., and ). Finally, we will indicate the bit length of the modulus used by Paillier as . For security reasons, recent applications usually require . In a nonencrypted domain (plaintext) implementation of the DFT, different scenarios may arise, since the inputs and the twiddle factors in the DFT/FFT implementation may be either fixed-point or floating-point numbers. In our analysis, we will consider the following cases.
• Fixed-point inputs: if the input signal is quantized using bits, its values can be directly mapped onto integer values in the interval so that we can assume .
• Floating-point inputs: in order to preserve the whole dynamic of the normalized floating-point representation, one should be able to represent values from to , where is the number of bits of the exponent. Unless some information about the properties of the input signal is known, this requires .
• Fixed-point implementation: by using and , a choice satisfying (42) for all implementations is or, equivalently, . If we assume , we can set .
• Floating-point implementation: a choice satisfying (43) for all implementations and all values of is , from which .
A. Implementation Constraints
One of the main problems of an implementation in the encrypted domain is its feasibility. Consider a scenario in which a set of encrypted signals must undergo different processing tasks. It is not realistic to adapt the parameters of the cryptosystem according to the processing task, mainly because this would produce a huge amount of encrypted data, and encrypting data with a homomorphic cryptosystem is usually an expensive procedure. In such a scenario, it is reasonable to assume that the signals are encrypted once and that each processing task employs the same set of encrypted data. Therefore, each processing task must rely on a feasible implementation (i.e., an implementation satisfying the requirements of the modulus).
Given , , and , in order to ensure that no wraparound occurs in the internal computations, the modulus of the cryptosystem must satisfy (44) where we can have (DFT), (radix-2), or (radix-4), and can be obtained from (18), (29), or (34). Considering practical choices of and , it is safe to assume , so that the aforementioned bound is satisfied by requiring (45) By using the aforementioned relationship, it is easy to assess whether a particular FFT can be implemented by relying on the minimum modulus (and, hence, on a standard Paillier implementation) or it requires an ad-hoc cryptosystem (e.g., as a function of ).
According to the considered scenario, one can choose the convenient values of and and substitute them into (45) in order to assess which implementation is feasible. In Fig. 1 , we show the minimum required by four different scenarios characterized by fixed-point inputs. If the number of FFT points is not very high (above ) in all of the scenarios, the encrypted FFT can be implemented relying on the given modulus. The only exception is given by the radix-2 implementations by using high precision coefficients, which require an extended modulus in order to cope with a number of points greater than . In Fig. 2 , we show the minimum required by three different scenarios characterized by floating point inputs. As in the previous example, the radix-2 implementation with single precision inputs requires an extended modulus only when using double precision coefficients and . The situation is quite different in the case of double precision inputs: due to the very high number of bits used to represent the input samples, each implementation would require an extended modulus. Note that the radix-4 implementation can be used with even if the number of DFT points grows very large. However, above , even the radix-4 implementation does not becomes any more feasible. Hence, if some processing is required with (a possible example is the processing of multidimensional signals), one has to resort to an alternative implementation (for example, the direct DFT) at the cost of greater complexity.
B. Complexity Comparisons
Another important aspect of an encrypted domain implementation is its computational complexity. When all of the implementations can be used by relying on the same modulus, one can simply compare the number of modular operations required by the different approaches. Also, however, a different scenario can be taken into consideration, in which the modulus of the cryptosystem is set to the minimum value required by a particular implementation. Since the cost of a modular operation depends on the modulus size [22] , [23] , a natural question is whether a fast algorithm requiring a higher modulus size (i.e., the FFT) can be less efficient than a naive implementation requiring a lower modulus size (i.e., the direct DFT).
In order to make a complexity comparison, we made the following simplifying assumptions: 1) the cost of the algorithm is dominated by the number of exponentiations and 2) the cost of a modular exponentiation (modulo ) is modeled as [24] , where can be interpreted as the cost of a bit operation (bit op).
Given the aforementioned hypotheses, the complexity of the different implementations can be expressed as bit ops (46 (49) is irrespective of the implementation of the complex multiplications. A detailed proof is given in Appendix A.
As an example in the case of a practical implementation, the complexity of the proposed FFTs is compared in Fig. 3 , assuming four real multiplications for each complex multiplication. Even if both FFTs are obliged to use a large modulus size, their complexity is always well below that of a direct DFT. In this scenario, the radix-4 algorithm is always the best one for what concerns the complexity, irrespective of the other parameters.
IX. CONCLUDING REMARKS
We have investigated the implementation of the DFT on a vector of encrypted samples relying on the homomorphic properties of the underlying cryptosystem. The relations between the maximum allowable DFT size and the modulus of the cryptosystem, the DFT/FFT implementation, and the required precision have been derived. The results have shown that the noise introduced by a s.p.e.d. implementation is usually smaller than in a classical fixed-point implementation and comparable to a floating point one. Also, the computational complexities of the different approaches have been derived and compared, taking the constraints of the s.p.e.d. implementation into account. We considered a first scenario in which the available cryptosystem is fixed and a second scenario in which the parameters of the cryptosystem may be adapted to the requirements of the FFT. The results demonstrate that the radix-4 FFT is best suited for both scenarios.
Our approach gives useful design criteria for the implementation of s.p.e.d. modules and suggests several other issues to be addressed in future research on s.p.e.d. topics. For instance, an interesting open question is the tradeoff between feasibility and complexity (i.e., the comparison between feasible but less efficient implementations and efficient but sometimes unfeasible ones). Other topics that need further research are the analysis of s.p.e.d. FFT algorithms having a radix of greater than four, the analysis of mixed radix and split radix algorithms, and the hardware issues in practical implementations. 
APPENDIX PROOF OF (49)
Consider the expressions of the complexity given in (46)-(48). In the following text, we will consider the case of four real multiplications for each complex multiplication (i.e., , , and ). The case of three real multiplications can be proved in a similar way. The following lemmas hold. The proof of (49) follows from the previous two lemmas.
